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CONVERSATIONS ON THE WARREN COURT’S IMPACT
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IN RE GAULT AT 50
Cara H. Drinan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that youth were
entitled to an array of procedural safeguards, including the right to
counsel, during juvenile delinquency proceedings.1 With its In re Gault
decision, the Supreme Court ushered in the “due process era” of juvenile
justice in America,2 beginning what some have called a “revolution in
children’s rights.”3 However, members of the Gault Court and
proponents of the decision in its day would be disappointed by the state
of juvenile justice in America today. Despite the Gault Court’s declaration
that children who face a loss of liberty deserve fundamental
constitutional protections,4 youth in the criminal justice system today
are more vulnerable than ever.
With police in schools and zero-tolerance policies on the books,
youth can easily come into contact with law enforcement and be shunted
into the criminal justice system.5 Once there, many young people do not
have legal representation even when they are entitled to it.6 And for
youth accused of a crime, the stakes are incredibly high. Youth in every
state can be transferred to adult court and charged as if they were
adults.7 In adult court, juveniles are subject to mandatory minimums
that were drafted with adults in mind.8 Youth can be held in adult
* © 2020, Cara H. Drinan. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law. J.D., Stanford Law School; M.A, Politics, Philosophy, and
Economics, The University of Oxford; B.A., Economics, Bowdoin College.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
2. Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 189 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014) (outlining three
stages of development in American juvenile justice, including early rehabilitative phase, due
process phase, and fear-driven stage of late-twentieth century).
3. Glenn Collins, Debate over Children’s Rights Is Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1981, at A1.
4. 387 U.S. at 36–37.
5. See infra pt. III.B.
6. See infra pt. III.A.
7. See infra pt. III.A.
8. See infra pt. III.B.
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detention centers despite the proven dangers of sexual assault, physical
violence, and suicide in those facilities.9 Finally, while the Supreme Court
abolished juvenile execution in 2005, the United States is the only
developed nation in the world that sentences children to die in prison.10
In short, the United States waged a war on kids in the late-twentieth
century, and the rights announced in Gault could not contain that war.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II discusses the Gault
opinion and its significance in 1967. Part III argues that Gault has never
been fully implemented and offers two explanations for its stunted
application, neither of which was within the Gault Court’s control. First,
as a function of institutional design, the Supreme Court was not in a
position to change the landscape of juvenile justice in a meaningful way.
Second, fear-driven legislative choices of the late-twentieth century
altered the criminal justice system for youth and adults in ways that the
Court never could have predicted. Part IV considers more recent juvenile
sentencing decisions in light of the post-Gault era. This consideration
drives home the reality that comprehensive, lasting juvenile justice
reform must be sought in state legislatures.
II. THE GAULT DECISION
In June 1964, 15-year-old Gerald F. Gault was on probation for
previously “having been in the company of another boy who had stolen
a wallet from a lady’s purse.”11 That month, a neighbor accused Gault and
his friend of making lewd remarks to her during a telephone call.12 The
opinion does not include the content of Gault’s alleged remarks, but
Justice Fortas described them as being “of the irritatingly offensive,
adolescent, sex variety.”13 As a result of the accusation, police picked
Gault up at his home while both of his parents were at work.14 They

9. See infra pt. III.C.
10. See infra pt. III.C.
11. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
12. Prank phone calls have been around almost as long as the telephone, and for most
adolescents prank phone calls are a harmless, if annoying, rite of passage. See Julie Beck, The Long
Life (and Slow Death?) of the Prank Phone Call, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1, 2016, https://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-life-and-death-of-the-prank-phonecall/476340/ (discussing how such calls provide adolescents with sought-after group bonding and
“low-stakes rebellion”).
13. 387 U.S. at 4.
14. Id. at 5.
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detained him and took him to a juvenile detention center—without
notifying his parents.15
In the following days and weeks, the entire process for determining
Gault’s guilt or innocence was informal, to say the least. The complaining
neighbor never appeared in court; the State never presented Gault’s
parents with notice of formal charges against their son; the State never
notified Gault or his parents of a right to counsel; and no rationale was
offered either for detaining Gault initially or for releasing him pending
his final hearing.16 Ultimately, the juvenile judge determined that Gault
had made the lewd phone call, and he sentenced Gault to six years in a
state industrial school, with only a conclusory explanation: “[A]fter a full
hearing and due deliberation the [c]ourt finds that said minor is a
delinquent child . . . .”17
Before finding Gault’s delinquency determination unconstitutional,
the Court canvassed the history of the American juvenile court model
and acknowledged its important and even laudable history.18 First
established in Illinois in 1899, early juvenile courts shared several
defining features: informality, wide judicial discretion, and most
importantly, a fundamental belief that a child accused of a crime was in
need of social rehabilitation, rather than punishment for its own sake.19
Early juvenile court advocates insisted that “[t]he child . . . essentially
good . . . was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of [the state’s] care
and solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial.”20 And the goal
of the juvenile court was to “establish precisely what the juvenile did and
why he did it . . . .”21 In this context, rules of criminal procedure were
seen as both irrelevant and counterproductive.
However, as the Gault Court concluded, by the mid-twentieth
century, juvenile courts across the country had strayed from the ideals
of their Progressive-era founders.22 Juveniles were dealing with the
worst of both worlds: they neither enjoyed the procedural safeguards of
the adult court model nor were they guaranteed solicitude from juvenile
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 14–17.
See AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS IN ADULT AND JUVENILE
COURTS 10–11 (2006); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 6–7 (2005).
20. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16.
21. Id. at 28.
22. Id. at 17–18 (“The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to say
the least—debatable. And in practice, as we remarked in the Kent case . . . the results have not been
entirely satisfactory.”). See also CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
LOST ITS WAY 16–20 (2017) (providing overview of American juvenile court).
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judges.23 Gerald Gault’s experience proved this point well. Gault had
engaged in normal adolescent behavior, and to the extent that his actions
were criminal, they were fairly minor.24 In fact, his conduct was entirely
consistent with what today’s neuroscience tells us about adolescent
crime.25 Adolescent crimes are often a function of group conduct where
susceptibility to peer pressure is greatest.26 These crimes may come
from a place of sexual curiosity and boundary testing,27 and they reflect
a lack of impulse control and inability to weigh long-term consequences
against short-term thrills.28
Yet despite the normative and minimal nature of Gault’s conduct, he
had a disastrous outcome in court.29 Because he was not in adult court,
he did not enjoy any of the procedural safeguards that may have helped
him mitigate, if not entirely defend, his charge.30 At the same time, he did
not enjoy the solicitude of a judge who was looking to ensure his
wellbeing and growth.31 Had Gault been an adult at the time of his
conviction, he would have faced a maximum fine of fifty dollars or two
months imprisonment.32 Instead, he was sentenced to six years
confinement.33
Reviewing a petition for habeas corpus filed by Gault’s parents, the
Supreme Court recognized the absurdity of this outcome.34 Justice
Fortas wrote that “[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court.”35 And the Court held that juveniles in
delinquency proceedings are entitled to basic procedural safeguards:
the right to notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to
23. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27–29.
24. Id. at 29. See also Elizabeth Cauffman et al., How Developmental Science Influences Juvenile
Justice Reform, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 21, 26 (2018).
25. Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 30.
26. Id. at 24–27 (discussing the link between adolescent susceptibility to peer pressure and
crime).
27. See Robin Walker Sterling, Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: An Impermissible Life
Sentence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 297 n.17 (2015) (discussing recent litigation around the issue of sex
offender registry for minors in light of their developmental differences and sexual curiosity).
28. Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 23–25.
29. As the Court itself noted, Gerald Gault had a family advocating for him and his freedom. One
can only imagine the detention outcomes for youth who did not have that kind of support. Gault,
387 U.S. at 28 (“[O]ne would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile
appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the Juvenile Judge
would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that the boy could be
disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previous transgressions.”).
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 15–16.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id. at 28.
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confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the right of
privilege against self-incrimination.36 The Court acknowledged that if
the traditional juvenile court model where “care would be used to
establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it”37 had ever
been appropriate, the flexibility of the model was no longer serving the
best interests of youth.38
In its day, Gault was promising—arguably revolutionary—in at
least two respects. First, the Gault Court recognized children as
independent beings with affirmative legal rights of their own, and this
was still a novel concept in 1967.39 Prior to Gault, juvenile delinquency
proceedings were treated as civil proceedings because it was thought
that children had a right not to liberty, but rather to custody—either
with parents or the state.40 In that context, when liberty was taken away,
the state “d[id] not deprive the child of any rights, because he ha[d]
none.”41 Thus, the Gault Court’s very premise—that a child had a liberty
interest at stake when accused of a crime—was progressive and marked
a step forward for youth.
Second, Gault, like the Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright only
four years before,42 represented an important move toward holding the
states accountable for their inequitable and often draconian criminal
justice practices. In both cases, the Court formally recognized the
fundamental unfairness in asking individuals to confront the awesome
power of the state on their own when they faced a loss of liberty.43
Despite the fact that neither Gideon nor Gault have been fully

36. Id. at 31–58.
37. Id. at 28.
38. Id. at 29–30 (“So wide a gulf between the State’s treatment of the adult and of the child
requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than cliché can
provide. As Wheeler and Cottrell have put it, ‘The rhetoric of the juvenile court movement has
developed without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of court and institutional
routines.’”) (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 36.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id.; see also Steven Mintz, Placing Children’s Rights in Historical Perspective, CRIM. LAW BULL.,
Summer 2008, at 313, 313–14 (noting that at the end of the eighteenth century, “the notion that
children might be rights-holders seemed laughable,” but that by the 1960s there was “a heightened
stress on children’s autonomy rights”).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires states to provide indigent
defendants with counsel in criminal prosecutions).
43. See, e.g., id. at 344 (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. . . . [L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.”).

438

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 49

implemented on the ground,44 both were still watershed decisions.
Gideon and Gault required the states to begin the project of securing
representation for poor adults and children accused of a crime.45
Moreover, by granting poor criminal defendants formal procedural
protections, the Court armed those individuals with a new oversight
mechanism: constitutional claims in federal court when those
protections were denied.46
In sum, the Gault decision was profound in its day, and it ushered in
a new era of formal protections for juvenile defendants. However, as
discussed in Part III, events beyond the Court’s control in the latetwentieth century eclipsed the import of the decision itself and further
jeopardized youth accused of crime.
III. GAULT’S PROMISE UNFULFILLED
Gault has never been fully implemented, and this Part offers two
explanations for its stunted application, neither of which the Gault Court
could have prevented. First, as a matter of institutional design, the
Supreme Court was never in a position to significantly improve the
juvenile justice concerns illuminated in Gault. Second, fear-driven
legislative choices of the late-twentieth century altered the criminal
justice system for youth and adults in ways that the Court could not have
predicted.
A. Gault’s Failures
Members of the Warren Court who sought criminal justice reform
would be disappointed to learn of Gault’s legacy. Studies of juvenile
defense have consistently concluded that Gault has never been fully
implemented at the state and local level.47 A 1995 report by the
American Bar Association found that “a large number of children in this
country still appear in court without a lawyer,” despite Gault and federal

44. For a discussion of Gault’s implementation challenges, see infra pt. III. Many scholars and
organizations have documented the states’ refusal to implement Gideon over the decades. See, e.g.,
NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Justice Denied 2 (2009), https://
constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf (describing ongoing failure of
states to provide effective representation to poor criminal defendants nearly five decades after
Gideon).
45. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
46. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
47. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., Access Denied: A National Snapshot of States’ Failure to Protect
Children’s Right to Counsel 4 (2017), http://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SnapshotFinal_single-4.pdf [hereinafter Access Denied].
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statutory law affirming the decision.48 Similarly, a 2003 survey by the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) found that
“only 42 percent of youth in custody reported having a lawyer . . . .”49
In 2017, the National Juvenile Defender Center released a report on
Gault’s fiftieth anniversary, and its key findings were damning.50 Despite
every state having basic structures to provide attorneys for children, few
states live up to Gault’s vision. For example, only eleven states guarantee
children a lawyer regardless of financial status,51 and in all other
jurisdictions financial eligibility must be resolved on a case-by-case
basis before the child receives representation.52 As the report explains,
this eligibility inquiry is problematic in several respects. It can delay
representation, sometimes requiring the child to be detained without a
lawyer in the process; it can intimidate the family and prompt a child to
waive their right to counsel; and the inquiry often excludes families
whose income is still too low to contemplate hiring private counsel.53 At
the same time, according to the report, no state guarantees children a
lawyer during interrogation, perhaps the most critical stage in the state’s
investigation;54 thirty-six states allow children to be charged fees for
“free” lawyers;55 waiver without legal advice is the norm;56 and only
eleven states provide legal representation to minors after sentencing.57
In sum, “[f]ifty years after the landmark [Gault] decision, state laws and
practices still do not honor the constitutional rights of youth.”58
Meanwhile, the stakes have never been higher for juvenile
defendants. Young people can be charged in adult court far too easily and
frequently; they can be subject to extreme sentences; they can be housed
in adult facilities; and their chances of successful rehabilitation and
48. AM. BAR. ASS’N., JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, A Call for Justice: An Assessment of Access to Counsel
and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 21 (1995), http://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/A-Call-for-Justice_An-Assessment-of-Access-to-Counsel-and-Qualityof-Representation-in-Delinquency-Proceedings.pdf.
49. Sarah Barr, Campaign Says Juveniles Need Better Access to Quality Legal Counsel, JUV. JUST.
INFO. EXCHANGE (May 17, 2016), http://jjie.org/campaign-says-juveniles-need-better-access-toquality-legal-counsel/246782/.
50. Access Denied, supra note 47, at 7.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 10–13 (describing the methods for determining financial eligibility and the flaws with
those processes).
53. Id. at 11 (citing these concerns among others).
54. Id. at 15–16.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 25 (noting that in forty-three states children can waive their right to a lawyer before
consulting with a lawyer).
57. Id. at 31; see also id. at 32 (discussing the range of advocacy counsel could provide to youth
after sentencing, such as ensuring safe conditions of confinement, taking up appeals, reducing fees
and fines, and protecting access to family during confinement).
58. Id. at 4.
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reentry are hampered by all of these variables.59 This dire state of affairs
for justice-involved youth has garnered attention and prompted
innovative forms of activism in recent years.60
For example, in 2015, the federal government filed a Statement of
Interest (Statement) in a class-action lawsuit challenging the
deprivation of counsel for youth in Georgia.61 The Statement was an
attempt to inform the state court’s analysis of children’s due process
rights as articulated in Gault, and it was the first such filing by the
Department of Justice since the Gault decision itself.62 Equally
noteworthy, the National Football League Players Coalition (Coalition)
recently chose to focus on juvenile justice reform as one of its key racial
and social equality pursuits.63 At the Coalition’s first-ever Super Bowl
Press Conference, it announced its plan to invest two million dollars in
six organizations, including the National Juvenile Defender Center.64
Since that announcement of grant funding, the Coalition has also used its
platform to educate the public about the importance of representation
for youth accused of a crime.65
In short, while the Gault decision triggered formal rights for
children accused of crimes across the country, those rights still have
never been fully implemented more than fifty years later. And as
promising as this recent sense of urgency about juvenile representation
is, we must understand why the Gault decision has never been impactful
at the state level in order to chart a path forward.
B. Understanding Gault’s Anemic Implementation
The state of juvenile representation nationwide today is
disappointing to say the least, but one can hardly fault the Warren Court
for this gap between its declaration of rights in Gault and the decision’s

59. See infra pt. III.B.
60. See Dept. of Justice Statement of Interest Supports Meaningful Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Prosecutions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjustice-statement-interest-supports-meaningful-right-counsel-juvenile-prosecutions.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Key Pillars, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS COAL., https://players-coalition.org/key-pillars/
(under “Criminal Justice Reform,” see “Topline Issues”) (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
64. Craig Dray, Players Coalition Holds First Press Conference at Super Bowl LIII, PRO PLAYER
INSIDERS (Jan. 30, 2019), http://proplayerinsiders.com/nfl-player-team-news-features/playerscoalition-holds-first-press-conference-super-bowl-liii/.
65. The Coalition regularly advocates for juvenile justice reform by tweeting about the issue,
including the specific issue of deprivation of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League
Players Coal., TWITTER (May 25, 2019, 2:32 PM), https://twitter.com/playercoalition/status/
1132399067361730560.
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anemic implementation at the state level. Rather, one can understand
Gault’s stunted implementation as a function of two issues: institutional
design and legislative choices—neither of which were within the Court’s
control.
1. Institutional Design
As scholars have discussed at length, the Supreme Court can
participate in social change, but not in isolation.66 Rather, advocates of
social change often obtain confirmation of rights from the Court, while
implementation of those rights falls to the executive and legislative
branches—frequently at the state level.67 As a result, rights as
announced by the Court often go unfulfilled,68 and the right to counsel
demonstrates this principle well. In 1963, the Supreme Court announced
that the Sixth Amendment grants individuals the right to counsel in
criminal cases at the state’s expense.69 More than fifty years after that
decision, the right to counsel has never been fully realized.70 For
decades, public defenders have been overworked and underpaid despite
litigation challenging public defense systems and legislative attempts to
improve those systems.71
And no wonder—indigent defense is a locally-implemented issue,
and in a nation of more than three thousand counties, there has yet to be
an adequate accounting of indigent defense services, let alone an
assessment of their efficacy.72 At the same time, indigent defense has
always presented a political process problem: many voters view
themselves as far removed from the criminal justice system, and elected
66. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
35 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court itself cannot generate meaningful social change); see
also L.A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court, Social Change, and Legal Scholarship, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1615,
1616 (1992) (reviewing HOLLOW HOPE); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of
Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 1712 (2004) (suggesting that the Court can articulate powerful
principles of social reform despite constraints imposed on the judicial branch).
67. See Powe, supra note 66, at 1622.
68. See id. (“[H]istory reveals that judicial decisions, by themselves, produced virtually no
change. Only when supplemented by executive and legislative action did judicial action lead to real
social change.”).
69. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
70. See supra text accompanying note 57; Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to
Counsel, 50 Years After ‘Gideon’, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/a
rchive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-years-after-gideon/273433/.
71. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 434, 437, 476 (2009).
72. For a discussion of national attempts to document the methods of indigent defense services
and their efficacy, see generally 6AC & Our Work, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., http://sixthamendment
.org/about-us/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020); Overview, MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measures
forjustice.org/about/overview/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
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state actors rarely champion the rights of poor minorities.73 The same
has been true for the right to counsel for youth accused of a crime.74
Thus, out of the gates, Gault faced an uphill battle in terms of
implementation.
2. Legislative Choices
Meanwhile, the Warren Court simply could not have predicted the
tough-on-crime politics of the late-twentieth century, and no procedural
rights could keep pace with the trend toward mass incarceration.75 Even
though crime had begun to rise in the 1960s and there was great fear
associated with that trend,76 at the time of the Gault decision the
nationwide jail and prison population was still below 300,000.77 But
between 1960 and the mid-1990s, violent crime rose consistently,
reaching an all-time peak in 1991.78 The War on Drugs was ushered in,
and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle embraced tough-on-crime
political positions, putting more crimes on the books, enhancing the
penalties for crimes, and rewarding prosecutors for tough sanctions.79
As the United States sent more people to prison for longer periods of
time, its correctional population exploded.80 With more than two million

73. Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v.
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2172 (2013) (“[T]he criminal courts are not a concern of most
people because they deal primarily with racial minorities and the poor. As Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy observed at the time of Gideon, ‘the poor person accused of a crime has no lobby.’ States,
counties, and municipalities have no incentive to provide those they are prosecuting with capable
lawyers.”) (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 2152.
75. A full discussion of mass incarceration is outside the scope of this brief Symposium Article.
Two dominant accounts are offered in MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6, 16–17 (2010) (arguing that the War on Drugs and racially
discriminatory law enforcement and sentencing practices generated mass incarceration as a tool
for racial oppression), and JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 127–28, 233–35 (2017) (challenging the dominant narrative that the War
on Drugs and mandatory minimums drove mass incarceration and arguing that prosecutorial
discretion is largely to blame).
76. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Oliver Roeder, America’s Faulty Perception of Crime Rates, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/americas-faultyperception-crime-rates (citing a violent crime rate increase of 126% between 1960 and 1970).
77. Trends in U.S. Corrections, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (June 2019), https://sentencingprojec
t.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf.
78. Charles C.W. Cooke, Careful with the Panic: Violent Crime and Gun Crime Are Both Dropping,
NAT’L REVIEW (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/427758/careful-panicviolent-crime-and-gun-crime-are-both-dropping-charles-c-w-cooke.
79. See ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 42–58; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2471–72 (discussing prosecutors as an ambitious group
and convictions as the metric of success for prosecutors).
80. See ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 54–55.
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adults and children behind bars today, the United States leads the world
in its rate of incarceration.81
Youth suffered from the trend toward mass incarceration, too.
While states failed to fully implement Gault, they simultaneously
implemented laws and policies that made children more vulnerable than
ever in the criminal justice system.82 As I have argued more fully
elsewhere, a few legislative decisions of the late-twentieth century were
especially damaging for youth accused of a crime: transfer laws,
mandatory minimums, and the emerging school-to-prison pipeline.83
a. Transfer Laws
For most of the twentieth century, a child accused of committing a
crime was typically dealt with in the juvenile justice system.84 It was
possible for the juvenile judge to transfer a child’s case into adult court,
but such transfer “involved a hearing at which the state had to persuade
the juvenile judge that the [youth] was not amenable to rehabilitation,
had committed a crime too serious for adjudication in juvenile court
given its punitive limits, or both.”85 Transfer of a juvenile case into adult
court was rare and difficult.86
Beginning in the 1970s, states amended their laws in a number of
ways, making it easier for children to be prosecuted in adult criminal
court.87 Some state laws reduced the age at which a juvenile judge was
authorized to transfer a child to adult court, while other state laws
automatically excluded certain juvenile defendants from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction based upon the child’s age or the charged offense.88
Finally, some states amended their laws to vest the prosecutor with
unilateral authority to make the juvenile transfer decision.89

81. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.
82. See, e.g., DRINAN, supra note 22, at 23.
83. Id. The central thesis of THE WAR ON KIDS is that the United States abandoned the premise
of the juvenile court model in the late twentieth century, enacting punitive practices that made it
possible for youth accused of a crime to be treated as adults. Transfer laws, mandatory minimums,
and the school-to-prison pipeline were part of that trajectory. See id. at 20–24, 46–56.
84. KUPCHIK, supra note 19, at 1.
85. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 20; cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 141–44
(2005) (discussing mission of juvenile court as being its primary limitation in that some juvenile
cases warrant a punishment response the juvenile court cannot impose).
86. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 20.
87. KUPCHIK, supra note 19, at 1, 154–59 (discussing the three primary methods for transfer of
jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court).
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id.
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Today, every state has some mechanism for transferring a juvenile
case into adult court, and most states have several.90 In twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia, there is at least one transfer
provision with no minimum age requirement.91 Thirty-four states have
“once an adult always an adult” provisions, meaning that once a child has
been convicted in adult court, any future adjudications for that child will
take place in adult court.92
These laws have codified the legal fiction that a child becomes an
adult in the eyes of the law when accused of a crime, and they have
exposed hundreds of thousands of children to the adult criminal justice
system.93 Unlike the juvenile court’s focus on rehabilitation, “[t]he adult
criminal process is entirely adversarial, and incarceration is the
common punishment.”94 Even if the incarceration term is relatively
short, the collateral consequences of an adult criminal conviction can be
life-altering for anyone, let alone a minor.95 For example, a child
convicted in adult court may be required to register as a sex-offender for
life,96 and juvenile convictions in adult court can serve as prior
convictions for purposes of adult recidivism statutes.97 In short, for
justice-involved youth, the threshold question of whether their case will
be transferred to adult court is often outcome-determinative.

90. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEG. (Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-ofjurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx; see also Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as
Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 3
(Sept. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
91. Juveniles Tried as Adults, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2016),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp.
92. Griffin et al., supra note 90, at 3.
93. Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 8,
2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-of-keeping-juvenilesin-adult-prisons/423201/ (reporting that nearly 200,000 children enter the adult criminal system
each year).
94. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 53.
95. Cynthia Soohoo, You Have the Right to Remain a Child: The Right to Juvenile Treatment for
Youth in Conflict with the Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2017) (“Criminal convictions carry
a life-long stigma that can prevent youth from accessing higher education or getting a job, further
increasing the risk of recidivism. Criminal convictions can limit access to driver’s licenses and
prevent youth from voting or holding public office.”).
96. Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (2013) (“In some jurisdictions,
lifetime juvenile sex offender registration is mandatory for certain offenses.”).
97. United States v. Orona, 724 F.3d 1297, 1309–10 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that juvenile
adjudication could be used as predicate offense for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act); see
also id. at 1302 (canvassing state laws on the issue).
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b. Mandatory Minimums
Around the same time that states introduced transfer laws, both the
federal government and the states introduced increasingly punitive
sentencing schemes, including mandatory minimum sentences.98 The
convergence of these two developments meant that by the end of the
twentieth century, children could easily be prosecuted in adult court,
and in adult court, they could be subjected to harsh, often mandatory
sentences—sentences that refused to acknowledge the mitigating
aspects of youth.99 As the United States Supreme Court has recently
acknowledged, imposing lengthy sentences on minors, especially on a
mandatory basis, creates a fundamental unfairness.100 First, a child
sentenced to a long term of years will serve a much greater percentage
of their life than an adult who receives the same sentence.101 Second,
lengthy mandatory sentences ignore the scientific fact that children are
both less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation over time.102
Because of this science, in recent years at least two jurisdictions have
outlawed the application of mandatory minimums to justice-involved
youth.103
c. School-to-Prison Pipeline
By the end of the twentieth century, the nation had embraced
extreme juvenile justice practices, and the idea that youth were
dangerous began to trickle down to schools.104 Specifically, schools
98. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 22–24.
99. Id.
100. See infra pt. IV.
101. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (“Life without parole is an especially harsh
punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years
and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-yearold each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”).
102. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
103. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Iowa 2014) (abolishing mandatory minimums as
applied to juveniles); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409, 420 (Wash. 2017) (“[W]e hold that
sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated
with the youth of any juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system.”).
104. Not only did youth suffer from the general fear associated with rising crime, but also in the
mid 1990s, John DiIulio predicted the emergence of a juvenile “superpredator”—“that there would
be hordes upon hordes of depraved teenagers resorting to unspeakable brutality, not tethered by
conscience.” Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredatorthreat-of-90s.html?_r=0. DiIulio was wrong, and he later admitted as much; between 1994 and
2011, juvenile homicide actually fell by two-thirds. Nonetheless, his theory of the juvenile
superpredator loomed large during the late 1990s and impacted social views of youth as needing
containment. Id. A full discussion of the school-to-prison pipeline is outside the scope of this Article.
For a thorough discussion of the dynamic, see, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Students, Police and the School to
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introduced security measures historically reserved for criminal justice
efforts.105 For example, schools began to employ not just locking doors
and gates, but also surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and drugsniffing dogs.106 The most visible part of this trend was the introduction
of security personnel inside schools, often police officers or school
resource officers (SROs).107 At the same time, schools across the nation
adopted “zero-tolerance” school discipline policies—essentially
mandatory minimums in the school setting.108 These policies involve
predetermined consequences for infractions, are usually harsh, and do
not take into account context or potentially mitigating variables.109
Coupled with the presence of law enforcement in schools, zerotolerance policies have resulted in youth being arrested and charged in
cases where, only a few decades ago, school administrators would have
handled the matter.110 As Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan explains, a failure
to clearly define the role of SROs at the local level has led to a significant
expansion in power for SROs.111 In many communities, SROs are not in
the building just for law enforcement purposes, but rather they are also
called upon to enforce school disciplinary rules—even things as minor
as uniform violations.112 This was a perfect storm for children in school
buildings:
State laws and school district policies required that schools refer
student misbehavior in schools to law enforcement. Broad criminal
laws—such as those criminalizing any behavior which amounted to
“disturbing schools”—rendered a large swath of adolescent
misbehavior criminal. In combination with these policies, SROs’
increased presence and involvement in school discipline led to a
sharp increase in arrests for incidents arising at school.113

Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919 (2016); Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School to Prison
Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313 (2016).
105. See DRINAN, supra note 22, at 46–52 (discussing the school-to-prison pipeline and the way
in which it has shunted kids into the criminal justice system).
106. Id. at 47.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 48.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches Following School-to-Prison Pipeline
Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2039–40 (2019).
112. Id. at 2040.
113. Id. at 2040–41.
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In this process, America “outlawed adolescence.”114
The impact of these legislative choices cannot be overstated: they
were nothing short of a war on kids, and the results have been
devastating, especially for poor minority youth. Today, every
jurisdiction has some provision (and most states have several) that
permits a juvenile to be transferred to adult criminal court, oftentimes
with no judicial oversight and without a minimum age.115 Youth in adult
court are subject to sentences, even mandatory ones, that were drafted
with adults in mind.116 Youth can be housed in adult correctional
facilities, despite being the most vulnerable to physical and sexual
assault in those locations.117 Youth endure conditions of confinement
that we once thought appropriate for only the most dangerous adult
inmates, including mechanical restraints and solitary confinement.118
Until 2005, the United States was the only nation to execute people for
juvenile offenses,119 and today we are the only developed nation in the
world that still sentences children to die in prison.120
Moreover, as is true in the adult system, the nation’s extreme
juvenile practices have had a disproportionate impact on poor and
minority youth.121 Black youth are more than twice as likely as white
youth to be arrested,122 and even as overall youth detention rates
continue to decline, black youth are five times as likely as white youth to

114. Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-america-outlawedadolescence/501149/.
115. See Powe, supra note 66, at 1622 (“[H]istory reveals that judicial decisions, by themselves,
produced virtually no change. Only when supplemented by executive and legislative action did
judicial action lead to real social change.”).
116. See ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 17; PFAFF, supra note 75, at 127–28, 233–35; Eisen, supra
note 76; Trends in U.S. Corrections, supra note 77; Cooke, supra note 78.
117. See DRINAN, supra note 22, at 72–81 (discussing the evidence that adult prison is a
dangerous place for minors).
118. See generally Growing Up Locked Down: Youth in Solitary Confinement in Jails and Prisons
Across the United States, AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION 48, 60–65 (Oct. 12, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/sites
/default/files/field_document/us1012webwcover.pdf.
119. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty.”).
120. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/.
121. Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The Impact of Poverty on African American Children in the Child
Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems, 4 FORUM ON PUB. POLICY ONLINE 1 (2010),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ913052.pdf.
122. Samantha Michaels, Black Kids Are Five Times Likelier than White Kids to Be Locked Up,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/black-kids-are5-times-likelier-than-white-kids-to-be-locked-up/.

448

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 49

be detained.123 Similarly, poverty shunts children into detention who
would never be there if they had the financial resources to pay for a
diversion program or an ankle bracelet—let alone an effective
attorney.124
In sum, despite the formal rights afforded to juvenile defendants by
the Gault decision, the Court simply could not contain the states’ efforts
to treat children as adults in both procedural and sentencing terms.
IV. LEARNING FROM GAULT
Reflecting on Gault and its legacy today is instructive, especially
given the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to rein in extreme juvenile
sentencing.125 It is tempting for advocates of juvenile justice reform to
put tremendous stock in these juvenile sentencing decisions and to look
to the Court for further leadership on the juvenile justice reform front.126
But as Gault at fifty suggests, that would be misguided. The final Part of
this Article considers the Court’s recent juvenile sentencing cases and
offers some suggestions for how juvenile justice advocates might
conceive of and leverage those cases given the lessons of Gault’s
implementation.
A. The Miller Trilogy
In a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy,127 the Supreme Court
has limited the extent to which states can subject children to the
harshest sentences on the books.128 In 2005, the Supreme Court held in
Roper v. Simmons that the Constitution forbids execution of those who
commit homicide prior to the age of eighteen.129 Relying upon
longstanding Eighth Amendment methodology, the Court examined
youth as a group and analyzed whether execution of minors was

123. Black Disparities in Youth Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/black-disparities-youth-incarceration/.
124. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 29–34 (describing the link between poverty and youth contact
with the criminal justice system).
125. Recent Court Cases on Extreme Sentences for Youth, FAIR SENTENCING FOR YOUTH,
http://fairsentencingforyouth.org/legislation/us-supreme-court/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
126. See id.
127. This term refers to Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
128. I have discussed these decisions in greater detail in prior works. See DRINAN, supra note 22,
at 84–96; Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787 (2016); Cara H. Drinan,
Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the
Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012).
129. 543 U.S. at 578.
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proportionate given their diminished culpability and greater capacity
for rehabilitation.130 At the same time, the Court looked at legislative
trends regarding juvenile execution and exercised its own judgment to
rule that the practice violated evolving standards of decency.131 Five
years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court again relied upon
neuroscience documenting the differences between adolescent and
adult brains to hold that the Constitution precludes a life-without-parole
sentence for a minor who commits a non-homicide crime.132 In 2012, in
Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
bars juvenile life-without-parole sentences except for the rare juvenile
whose crime reflects “irreparable corruption.”133 And according to the
Miller Court, sentencing bodies must engage in a searching analysis of
the minor’s home, educational, mental, physical, and social
environments in order to make that determination.134 Finally, in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that its Miller decision was
retroactively applicable, and with its decision, thousands of prisoners
nationwide became eligible for a resentencing or parole hearing.135
These decisions reflect the lessons of neuroscience—science that
confirms what “any parent knows.”136 This science tells us that the
frontal lobe of the brain controls functions like risk assessment and
judgment; that the brain is still maturing well into late adolescence; and,
as a result, adolescents are more subject to peer pressure than their
adult counterparts, and they value short-term gain over long-term
goals.137 Because of their fleeting immaturity, children are both less
culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation.138 In sum, the Miller
trilogy stands for the proposition that children are different in the eyes
of the law, and state sentencing practices must reflect that fact.

130. Id. at 569–74 (citing broad differences between adults and minors and how those
differences impact punishment theory).
131. Id. at 575.
132. 560 U.S. at 67–68, 82 (abolishing juvenile-life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide crimes).
133. 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 476–80.
135. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). The Sentencing Project estimates that 2,100 individuals were
sentenced to mandatory JLWOP and became eligible for relief under Montgomery. Josh Rovner,
Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Jul. 23, 2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/.
136. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (“Our decisions [in Roper and Graham] rested not only on common
sense—on what ‘any parent knows’—but on science and social science as well.”) (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 471–72. See generally Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice
Policymaking, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410 (2017).
138. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–75.
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B. Lessons from Gault as Applied to Miller and the Path Forward
In the last decade, advocates have leveraged these Eighth
Amendment decisions to urge radical changes to the treatment of
justice-involved youth. First and foremost, grass-roots organizations
have pursued the abolition of juvenile-life-without-parole (JLWOP) and
other extreme juvenile sentences.139 In addition, citing the “kids are
different” rationale of these cases,140 scholars have argued for reexamination of juvenile transfer laws and for conditions of confinement
that reflect young people’s vulnerability and unique capacity for
rehabilitation.141 The juvenile defense bar now recognizes that, when
minors face a potential life sentence, it is tantamount to a capital trial for
youth, and there are specific, articulated standards for this kind of
representation.142 Juvenile advocates have challenged sex-offender
registration requirements for minors, arguing that lifetime registry
violates the logic and rationale of the Miller trilogy.143 Finally, citing the
Court’s requirement that states provide minors a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release,”144 lawyers and scholars have promoted
youth-specific parole protocols for minors serving lengthy terms.145
To date, these efforts have produced mixed results. On one hand,
juvenile justice advocates have made some major strides toward ageappropriate sentencing for youth in America in the wake of the Miller
trilogy. For example, at the time of the Miller decision, only five states
139. The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth has been the primary change-agent on this
issue nationally. See Tipping Point: A Majority of States Abandon Life-Without-Parole Sentences for
Children, CAMP. FOR THE FAIR SENT. OF YOUTH (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org
/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf [hereinafter Tipping Point] (discussing progress since
Miller and need for continued JLWOP reform).
140. Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 929, 949 (2015) (stating that with the Roper decision, “[t]he Court’s modern ‘kids are
different’ jurisprudence was born”).
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Children Are Different: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 99–103 (2013) (discussing Miller trilogy implications for both transfer law
and appropriate correctional environments).
142. See Heather Renwick, Trial Defense Guidelines: Representing a Child Client Facing a Possible
Life Sentence, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH (Mar. 2015), https://www.fairsentencing
ofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/Trial-Defense-Guidelines-Representing-a-Child-Client-Facing-aPossible-Life-Sentence.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 96 at 5; Spencer Klein, The New Unconstitutionality of Juvenile
Sex Offender Registration: Suspending the Presumption of Constitutionality for Laws That Burden
Juvenile Offenders, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2017); Sterling, supra note 27, at 297 n.17.
144. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75
(2010)).
145. See, e.g., Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and
California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (2016); Sarah French
Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89
IND. L.J. 373, 377 (2014).

2020]

In Re Gault at 50

451

banned JLWOP.146 Today, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
ban the sentence, while another five states have no one serving
JLWOP.147 Moreover, as recently as 2015, nine states automatically
charged seventeen-year-olds in adult court and two states routinely
treated sixteen-year-olds as adults.148 Today, in forty-five states, the
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction is seventeen, with only five
states routinely charging sixteen-year-olds in adult court.149 At the same
time, California recently passed legislation preventing youth fifteen and
under from being transferred into adult court for any crime.150 The
success of these “raise the age” campaigns in recent years is due in large
part to the Miller trilogy and the widespread acceptance that juveniles—
even seventeen-year-olds—still have years of brain development ahead
of them.151 Finally, as of December 2018, nearly 400 people who were
sentenced as youth to die in prison have now come home because of
state changes in sentencing and parole laws.152 This is remarkable
change in a short period of time.
And yet, Miller’s implementation has neither been straightforward
nor has it been consistent across the country. To begin, many state
courts and legislatures were hesitant to adopt meaningful changes in the
early aftermath of Graham and Miller.153 At the same time, while the
abolition of JLWOP now seems achievable in the future, thousands of
youth sentenced to de facto life terms may not be so fortunate as courts
continue to be split on how to handle such sentences.154 Moreover, in
some jurisdictions where legislators have enacted reforms designed to
give youth a chance at reentry, prosecutors are attempting to thwart

146. See Tipping Point, supra note 139, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Maurice Chammah, The 17-Year-Old Adults, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 3, 2015), https:
//www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/03/the-17-year-old-adults.
149. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS.
(Jan. 11, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-ofjurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx.
150. Sara Tiano, California Passes Bill Banning Transfer of Juveniles Under 16, CHRON. OF SOCIAL
CHANGE (Aug. 30, 2018), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/justice/juvenile-justice-2/californiapasses-bill-banning-transfer-of-juveniles-under-16/32081 (emphasis added).
151. Marc Schindler & Vincent Schiraldi, Good Reasons to Raise Age for Juvenile Justice, JUSTICE
POL’Y INST. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/9871.
152. See Tipping Point, supra note 139, at 6.
153. See generally Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, supra note 128, at 785.
154. See DRINAN, supra note 22, at 94–96. Courts have been split on the question whether de
facto life terms and literal life terms should be treated the same under the Miller line of cases.
Compare Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting claim that Graham clearly
applies to the “practical equivalent of life without parole”), with State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 658
(Wash. 2017) (holding that youth serving LWOP or de facto LWOP are equally entitled to a Miller
hearing).
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those efforts.155 For example, the District of Columbia recently passed
legislation giving prisoners who were under eighteen at the time of their
conviction and who have served at least twenty years a sentencing
review hearing.156 D.C.’s United States Attorneys have tried to block the
release of every prisoner who has sought freedom under the new law.157
Even in states where a parole mechanism is in place for those who were
sentenced to JLWOP, the parole process is often hollow and
meaningless.158 For example, despite his victory before the Supreme
Court, Henry Montgomery himself was recently denied parole for the
second time even though, at seventy-two, he has served fifty-five years
and has an impeccable improvement in his correctional record.159
Finally, despite the success with campaigns to “raise the age” of adult
court jurisdiction as a default matter, transfer laws remain ubiquitous
and often unchecked by judicial oversight, and youth continue to be
housed in adult correctional facilities.160 In short, advocates have
leveraged the Miller trilogy to seek ambitious reforms, but enormous
work remains to be done in order to guarantee age-appropriate
treatment for justice-involved youth in America.
It would be misguided to expect the Supreme Court to sustain the
reform momentum to date. Since its decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana
in 2016, in which the Court found Miller retroactively applicable, the
Court has appeared reticent to expand the scope of the Miller trilogy and
deferential in matters of Miller’s implementation.161 For example, as
discussed above, courts are split on the question of how to handle de
facto life sentences or life sentences that result from aggregate term-ofyear sentences, and the Court has refused to squarely address those
issues.162 At the same time, the science on which the Miller trilogy relied
155. Prosecutors Buck Supreme Court Mandate to Limit Life Without Parole Sentences for
Children, LA. CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.laccr.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/11/JLWOP-Deadline-Press-Release-11-2-17.pdf.
156. Kira Lerner, D.C. Shows Mercy for People Who Committed Crimes as Children, but Prosecutors
Are Fighting Back, THE APPEAL (May 23, 2019), https://theappeal.org/d-c-offers-hope-to-peoplewho-committed-crimes-as-children-but-prosecutors-are-fighting-back/.
157. Id.
158. See DRINAN, supra note 22, at 109–31 (describing the unpredictable nature of parole
proceedings for those serving JLWOP even within the same jurisdiction); see also French Russell,
supra note 145, at 373–74 (discussing the various ways in which state parole procedures fall short
of providing a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”).
159. Samantha Michaels, A 72-Year-Old Lifer Won a Landmark Supreme Court Ruling, but
Louisiana Won’t Let Him Out of Prison, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.motherjones.
com/crime-justice/2019/04/henry-montgomery-juvenile-lifer-louisiana-denied-parole/.
160. See supra pt. III.B.
161. See Bostic v. Dunbar, No. 17-912, cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 1593 (2018).
162. See id. In Bostic, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 241 years for a nonhomicide crime. Pet. Writ of Cert. at 2–3, Bostic v. Pash, 2017 WL 6606886 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2017) (No.
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suggests that adolescent brain development continues into the mid 20s,
and juvenile justice advocates have pushed for policies to reflect that
reality.163 Again, though, the Court does not seem inclined to consider
expanding the logic of the Miller trilogy to cases in which the defendant
is over eighteen.164 Moreover, in Virginia v. LeBlanc, the Court signaled
that it would grant states wide latitude in implementing the mandates of
the Miller trilogy.165 LeBlanc was sentenced to life without parole for a
non-homicide crime at sixteen.166 He sought relief under Graham, but
Virginia argued that he did, in fact, have a “meaningful opportunity to
obtain release” as required by Graham because the state had a geriatric
release program under which he could seek release at the age of sixty.167
The Supreme Court held that Virginia’s decision was not an
unreasonable application of Graham.168 Thus, the Court appears to have
no appetite either for vigorously enforcing the mandates of the Miller
trilogy or for expanding its core holdings.
At the same time, Justice Kennedy was a driving force behind the
Court’s examination of extreme juvenile sentences169 and a vocal
opponent of broader American criminal justice practices.170 With his
departure and the establishment of a solid conservative majority on the
Supreme Court,171 juvenile justice advocates can expect diminishing

17-912). Under state law, he was to become parole-eligible at the age of 112. Bostic argued that his
sentence was barred by Graham v. Florida, and yet the Supreme Court declined to answer the
question whether Bostic’s case should be treated the same as cases like Graham’s in which the
death-in-custody sentence is a stand-alone sentence. Id. at 7–8.
163. See David Jordan, Vermont Rolls Out a New Idea to Rehabilitate Young Offenders, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MON. (July 6, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0706/Vermont-rollsout-a-new-idea-to-rehabilitate-young-offenders (discussing state reforms that incorporate this
brain science).
164. Cf. Tucker v. Louisiana, No. 15-946, cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1801 (2016) (J. Breyer dissenting
from the denial of cert in defendant’s capital appeal and noting that the defendant was 18 years, 5
months and 6 days old at the time of crime).
165. 137 S. Ct. 1726, 1729 (2017).
166. Id. at 1727.
167. Id. at 1727–28.
168. Id. at 1728–29.
169. Reginald Dwayne Betts, What Break Do Children Deserve? Juveniles, Crime, and Justice
Kennedy’s Influence on the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM
743, 744–51 (2019).
170. See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at American
Bar Ass’n Annual Mtg. (Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript at https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html) (addressing scale, discrimination, and unfairness of
American corrections).
171. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Conservatives Overturn Precedent as Liberals Ask “Which
Cases the Court Will Overrule Next,” WASH. POST, May 13, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/supreme-courts-conservatives-overturn-precedent-as-liberals-ask-whichcases-the-court-will-overrule-next/2019/05/13/b4d3c4f8-7595-11e9-bd25c989555e7766_story.html?utm_term=.494c32628b60.
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Eighth Amendment protections from the Court.172 For example, the
Court recently granted certiorari in the case of Lee Boyd Malvo,173 one of
the convicted defendants in the “D.C. Sniper” killings.174 Malvo, who was
seventeen at the time that he and a much older co-defendant committed
ten murders, is currently serving a life sentence in Virginia.175 Malvo’s
attorneys have argued that, under Miller and Montgomery, he is entitled
to a resentencing hearing at which his youth and other mitigating
circumstances are considered.176 In other words, he is asking a lower
court to determine, per Miller, whether he is the rare case of a juvenile
whose crimes reflected “irreparable corruption” rather than “transient
immaturity.”177
Virginia, however, claims that the Commonwealth does not impose
mandatory life-without-parole sentences, and thus Malvo is not entitled
to retroactive relief.178 As Malvo’s attorneys pointed out in their brief
opposing certiorari, there is no widespread confusion regarding Miller’s
application, and a majority of courts have already concluded that Miller
applies to both mandatory and discretionary life-without-parole
sentences imposed on juveniles.179 Further, as Malvo argued,
Montgomery and Miller made clear that juvenile life-without-parole is
only constitutional when imposed upon “the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,”180 and no court has made
that determination in Malvo’s case. In sum, given the new composition
of the Court, there is good reason to expect diminished procedural

172. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1118–19 (2019) (rejecting petitioner’s
challenge to method of execution in light of his medical condition). See also Nina Totenberg,
Supreme Court’s Conservatives Defend Their Handling of Death Penalty Cases, NPR (May 14, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/14/722868203/supreme-courts-conservatives-defend-theirhandling-of-death-penalty-cases (discussing the contentious state of death penalty jurisprudence
among the Justices right now).
173. Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom. Mathena v. Malvo,
139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019).
174. Domenico Montanaro, Supreme Court to Take Up DC Sniper Case, Raising Issue of Sentencing
Minors, NPR (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/18/704420800/supreme-court-totake-up-d-c-sniper-case-raising-issue-of-sentencing-minors.
175. Id.
176. Malvo, 893 F.3d at 270–71 (describing history and nature of Malvo’s habeas claims under
Miller).
177. Id. at 272 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016)).
178. Pet. Writ of Cert. at 5, Mathena v. Malvo, 2018 WL 3993386 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2018) (No. 18217).
179. Br. Opp’n Cert. at 11–17, Mathena v. Malvo, 2018 WL 5263264 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2018) (No. 18217).
180. Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted).
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safeguards for youth accused of serious crimes and even some reason to
fear backsliding on this front.181
Even if this new Court may not sustain the momentum of the Miller
trilogy—let alone expand upon it—juvenile justice advocates need not
despair. In fact, there may be a silver lining to be found in the
examination of Gault at fifty. Gault at fifty serves as a reminder of how
modest the Supreme Court’s capacity for criminal justice reform really
is. Despite the Gault Court’s capacious vision of procedural rights for
children facing detention, at the end of the day, it was state legislative
bodies that determined the reality of those rights.182 And the reality has
been less than ideal, as discussed in Part III of this Article.183
However, this need not necessarily be true in the context of the
Miller trilogy. To the extent that state legislative bodies are the engines
of criminal justice reform, those engines can drive reform that either
expands or contracts the rights of justice-involved youth.184 And there is
good reason to think that today, unlike in the 1970s, state legislators
may be receptive to ongoing juvenile justice reform. Crime rates
continue to be historically low,185 and juvenile arrests are similarly low
as compared to their peak in the 1990s.186 States have already moved
toward reducing reliance on incarceration for kids, and juvenile
detention today is approximately half what it was in the 1990s.187
Perhaps because of the Court’s moral leadership in the Miller trilogy, the
brain science that tells us kids are different from adults has taken hold,
and the public is solidly in favor of rehabilitation for youth.188 Finally, a
181. Malvo’s counsel maintains that Virginia merely seeks to “relitigate Montgomery” through
the pretext of a retroactivity question. Id. at 23–27. If this is true, and if the Court were to accept the
Commonwealth’s invitation to do so, then the central findings of Miller and Montgomery would be
in jeopardy.
182. See supra pt. III.
183. See supra pt. III.
184. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 33 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice
Reinvestment (Nov. 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/08/33_states_refor
m_criminal_justice_policies_through_justice_reinvestment.pdf (describing the array of state reform
laws designed to reduce correctional populations and improve public safety in 33 states since
2007).
185. John Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/03/5-facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/
(discussing sharp declines in violent and property crime since 1993).
186. DEP’T OF JUST., Statistical Briefing Book, Juvenile Arrest Trends (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.
ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201.
187. Trends in Juvenile Incarceration, CHILD TRENDS, https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/
juvenile-detention (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (demonstrating that the number of youth in
detention in 2015 was less than half what it had been in 1997).
188. See, e.g., New Poll Results on Youth Justice Reform, GBAO STRATEGIES (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://backend.nokidsinprison.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Youth-First-National-PollMemo-March-2019-Final-Version-V2.pdf.
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number of states in recent years have demonstrated that they can
reduce reliance on youth incarceration while improving public safety.189
The climate for juvenile justice reform is much more hospitable than it
was in the immediate aftermath of Gault. Thus, even if the Court may not
be inclined to expand juvenile justice rights at this time, state lawmakers
have good reasons and political incentives to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of Gault at fifty is disappointing indeed, for there is
a tremendous gap between the procedural rights announced by the
Gault Court and the reality of those rights for youth. However, this
examination serves as an important reminder that state legislative
bodies are the primary agents of criminal justice policy. The Supreme
Court can, and occasionally has, provided crucial moral leadership on
the criminal justice front, but ultimately such issues are the tasks of state
legislative bodies. Just as the states implemented measures that
hindered the vision of the Gault Court, today state lawmakers can correct
the course of juvenile justice and perhaps make possible the Warren
Court’s procedural ideals in the process. In the wake of the Court’s more
recent Miller trilogy, a majority of states have now banned the sentence
of JLWOP, and states should continue the march toward national
abolition. But states can and should go further.190 They should return to
the Gault-era default of prosecuting youth in juvenile court and once
again make it difficult and rare for youth to be tried as adults. They
should abolish mandatory minimums as applied to juveniles and ensure
that youth in its own right is always a relevant, mitigating variable at
sentencing. They should acknowledge that incarceration has a
criminogenic effect on kids and make every effort to keep kids out of
detention. And in order to secure all of these measures, states should
begin by implementing the core right of Gault: effective representation
for kids whose liberty is in jeopardy.

189. Jake Horowitz, States Take the Lead on Juvenile Justice Reform, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(May 11, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2017/05/11/
states-take-the-lead-on-juvenile-justice-reform.
190. See generally DRINAN, supra note 22, at 132–53 (describing what a war for kids would look
like, including a return to juvenile court as the default; abolition of mandatory minimums for kids;
and keeping youth out of detention at all costs).

